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1. Purpose and plan 
The address was, and this paper is, about the analysis of policy towards immense risks, the 
management of which necessitates rapid and fundamental change in our economies. The focus is on 
action with urgency and at scale, and the logic of that action. If we are to harness our subject effectively, 
with relevance, and in real time, we must understand and articulate the problem defined by the science 
and then marshal, develop and apply our economics around the issues and challenges that are at the 
core of the problem. In so doing, we must avoid trying to force a huge and non-standard challenge into 
a narrow and standard framework, however convenient it might appear to be to try to use familiar 
“workhorses”. 
Accordingly, this analysis begins with the urgency and scale of the climate crisis. Then the paper 
examines the twin crises of climate and COVID, together with the difficulties of the decades leading up 
to COVID, and explains why we must tackle these crises together. It will be innovative investment that 
can drive us out of the COVID-related economic disruption and on to a much better and sustainable 
growth path. The case for such investments, and how they can be fostered, forms the subject matter of 
 
1 This paper is based on my Past President’s address to the Royal Economic Society, delivered in April 2021 at the Royal 
Economic Society 2021 Virtual Annual Conference. I would like to thank my successors at the Royal Economic Society, Rachel 
Griffiths, Carol Propper, Tim Besley, and my predecessors Andrew Chesher and Peter Neary, for the pleasure of working with 
them. Very sadly, Peter Neary passed away in June 2021. And thank you to all at the Royal Economic Society and Queens 
University, Belfast involved in the organisation of the Royal Economic Society 2021 Annual Conference. I am very grateful to 
Charlotte Taylor for her help in preparing the lecture and paper. My ideas on these issues have, over the years, benefited from 
discussions and collaborations with Philippe Aghion, Tony Atkinson, Amar Bhattacharya, Tim Besley, Alex Bowen, Peter 
Diamond, Partha Dasgupta, Simon Dietz, Ottmar Edenhofer, Sam Fankhauser, Claude Henry, Cameron Hepburn, Chris Hope, 
Brian Hoskins, Hans Peter Lankes, James Mirrlees, Jeremy Oppenheim, Naomi Oreskes, James Rydge, John Schellnhuber, 
Joseph Stiglitz, Josué Tanaka, Adair Turner, Julia Turner, Anna Valero, Bob Ward, Martin Weitzman, Chunping Xie, Dimitri 
Zenghelis, to whom I am indebted.  
The author acknowledges support from the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, at the London 




Part I. I will also reflect on what we have learned since the Stern Review of 2006 and why the lessons 
strengthen the case for the action proposed.  
I shall also argue that these new investments and innovations present a great opportunity, with many 
benefits beyond the fundamental rewards associated with reducing the risks from climate change. But 
strong action to foster and finance these investments will be crucial if they are to come through, and the 
radical nature of the changes will inevitably involve dislocation, the management of which is central to 
equitable and successful action. 
The case for action with urgency and at scale rests, in large measure, on the immense magnitude of 
climate risk and the very rapid emissions reductions which are necessary to create an acceptable 
chance of avoiding the worst of the risks. Tackling the problem in a coherent and effective way requires 
providing an analysis that identifies: the investments and innovations we need and the policies and 
finance that can draw through and support these investments and innovations. I will argue that these 
investments and innovations can deliver a new and attractive form of sustainable, resilient and inclusive 
growth. That argument can play a critical role in policy discussion and decision-making. 
It is surely clear that such analysis must be based on a dynamic approach to the economics of public 
policy, set in a complex and uncertain world. Policies focussed on change are of the essence; and the 
analysis must be grounded in and reflect a world where there are many market imperfections, where 
there are increasing returns to scale, where risk is central, and where the distribution of income and 
welfare is a crucial issue. This is an economics of public policy which is rather different from the bulk of 
work in economics in this area, but it is, in my view, an economics forced by the logic of the problem. 
In Part II of the paper, I will argue that the economics of climate change, and further, economics more 
broadly, must change to respond to this challenge of how to foster rapid transformation. There is nothing 
more important or exciting than this problem. It requires and opens up a tremendous amount of 
economics. There is so much in the richness of our subject that we can and must put to work. But there 
is more that we must create. The task requires expertise ranging across the entirety of our subject and, 
indeed, collaboration with other disciplines. And an engagement by our profession in a way beyond 




2. Urgency, scale and opportunity  
2.1 The science of climate change and the role of targets 
We must start with the science2. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has been in 
existence since 1988 and has produced a series of assessment reports, published every few years, 
about the current state of knowledge on climate change. Each one of those assessments has been 
more worrying than the last. The first one, published in 1990, was extremely worrying, but the outlook 
has only worsened as the evidence has become ever stronger of effects coming through more quickly 
and with greater intensity than we expected. The latest report (the sixth Assessment Review) published 
in August 2021 has demonstrated even more clearly and unanimously that we are under intense time 
pressure if we are to be able to hold temperatures at levels which manage the most extreme risks 
(IPCC, 2021). 
Global mean surface temperature is already 1.1°C above that of the end of the 19th century, our usual 
benchmark. This puts us on the edge of the temperature of the Holocene epoch; the benign period 
starting 10,000-12,000 years ago, during which our current civilisations emerged, following the end of 
the last ice age. It was during this period of fairly stable climate and temperature that many human 
cultures transitioned to a lifestyle based on sedentary agriculture. This is when we turned grasses into 
grains and stayed in one place as we nurtured crops until harvests; we built villages; we generated 
surpluses and used storage, thus creating opportunities for activities and services outside agriculture. 
With 1.1°C of temperature rise, we are now on the edge of the temperatures of that period and we are 
already seeing very intense effects: fires associated with heat and drought; severe flooding; hurricanes 
and typhoons; storm surges; sea level rises; local temperatures at levels dangerous to human life, and 
so on. In the summer of 2021, northern California and western Canada experienced temperatures close 
to 50°C, unprecedented and causing extensive loss of life and severe wildfires. And flooding, on a scale 
never previously experienced, occurred from Germany to China. There could be much worse to come. 
Our current emissions pathway implies that we are headed for temperature increases of more than 3°C 
 
2 I am very grateful to scientist friends, particularly Brian Hoskins and John Schellnhuber, for discussions of the science over 
the last two decades. Any misunderstandings are my own responsibility. 
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(UNEP, 2020). The science is clear that such temperatures could carry grave risks to humankind and 
the planet as a whole. As a world, we have not seen 3°C or more for around 3 million years, and at that 
time sea levels were 10 to 20 metres higher than now. Those kinds of temperatures would radically 
change lives and livelihoods across the globe. Many parts of the world could become uninhabitable. 
Under a business-as-usual scenario, one of the most densely populated regions in the world, the North 
China Plain, would likely experience deadly heatwaves later this century with “wet-bulb” temperature 
exceeding the threshold defining what people can tolerate while working outdoors (Kang and Eltahir, 
2018). Similar heatwaves could also occur in other densely populated parts of the world, such as North 
India. Hundreds of millions, possibly billions, would have to move3, likely resulting in severe and 
extended conflict. It is quite possible on current paths that we could see 4 or 5°C of temperature rise 
150 years or so from now; temperatures which the world has not seen for tens of millions of years. That 
would be absolutely devastating. The stakes we are playing for are immense.  
So, what do we have to do? To stabilise temperatures, we have to stabilise the concentrations of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere4. To stabilise the concentrations of greenhouse gases, the flow 
of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere must be net-zero. The earlier we stabilise the concentrations 
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, that is, the earlier we go to net-zero, the lower the temperature 
at which we stabilise. One can fine tune the climate science but that is the underlying, basic physics 
and the logic of the net-zero target. If we want to stabilise at 1.5°C (see below), we have to go to net-
zero CO2 by mid-century. Figure 1 shows the emissions pathways we need to follow if we are to stabilise 
at 1.5 or 2°C of temperature increase.  
 
3 Empirical estimates range substantially, from 50 million to 1 billion migrants associated with the effects of climate change 
during this century (Ferris, 2020). We should remember that we have been forced consistently over the last few decades to 
bring forward in time our estimates of when serious impacts can occur and revise estimates of their magnitudes upwards. And 
most models do not embody the tipping points that we think may occur at higher temperature which could generate dangerous 
feed-back loans (e.g. collapse of Amazon forest, thawing of permafrost, melting of polar ice sheets. Thus the numbers having 
to move could be badly underestimated in these analyses. 
4 Greenhouse gases are those whose molecules oscillate at a frequency that interferes with the infra-red energy reflected from 
the earth’s surface, thus preventing its escape and causing warming. CO2 is the most important and is long-lived. 
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Figure 1: Stylised emissions pathways for 1.5°C and 2°C and the gap to emissions trajectories 
based on current NDCs. 
NB: The NDC scenarios (unconditional and conditional) shown in figure 1 estimate the levels of GHG emissions 
projected as a result of the implementation of the mitigation actions pledged by countries in their Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs) (UNEP, 2020). Most countries offer targets or “NDCs”, to 2030. 
The differences between 1.5°C and 2°C are major. For example, the percentage of the global population 
exposed to severe heat at least once every 5 years would be 14% with 1.5°C of temperature rise, but 
37% with 2°C of temperature rise (Dosio et al., 2018). That is, the risk of being exposed to extreme heat 
every 5 years would be more than double for 2°C versus 1.5°C. Thus, when we consider the risks in a 
consequentialist way, the 2°C which we had earlier seen as dangerous to exceed, now itself seems 
very dangerous. That was the key lesson of the powerful and important IPCC report on 1.5°C of 2018, 
showing that the risks and dangers are still more serious than estimated previously.  An examination of 
the risks in terms of potential consequences for humans and the planet as a whole suggests that it 
makes a lot of sense to try to hold the temperature rise down to 1.5°C. And it is an achievable goal if 
we move strongly and quickly. Further, we will argue that such a path can carry many “co-benefits” 
beyond the reduced risks from climate change. It can be a much more attractive form of development.  
We can think of setting a temperature target as a “guard-rail” approach to extreme risk. It is a standard, 
indeed widely and understandably regarded as sensible, approach to great risks, particularly around 
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human life. It is clearly a consequentialist approach, although not necessarily one arising from simple, 
indeed simplistic, optimisation of some standard welfare function from an underlying model. In my view, 
the risks, including the possibility of the loss of life of billions, extended and severe conflict, destroyed 
biodiversity, and profound loss of quality of life, livelihoods and well-being, are not well-captured in 
narrow utility-based approaches. Neither the standard objective functions in economics, nor indeed the 
underlying models, capture the challenges at issue. Here, the governments and the people of the world, 
after thinking it through, came to the targets in the Paris agreement at COP21 of the UNFCCC in 
December 2015, of holding temperature increases “well below 2oC”, with best efforts to 1.5oC. The 
IPCC report of 2018 on 1.5oC further underlined the importance of that target. 
We should see the 1.5oC target as a balanced and consequentialist approach to immense risk. We can, 
of course, rig up expected utility models that give that conclusion but, in my view, they do not add 
significantly to the argument, particularly since such models are so sensitive to specification of structure, 
functional forms and parameters. Fairly modest model tweaks can give rather different results.  
We risk loss of life in the hundreds of millions or billions; because we do not know what the “carrying 
capacity” of a world of 4 or 5oC might be. It could be much lower than the 9-10 billion or so expected 
towards the end of the century. It is hard to understand or put numbers on the potential devastation and 
agony around the process of loss of life that could be involved. It is difficult, in particular, to argue that 
an expected utility approach captures the issues at stake in a plausible way. In my view, a direct risk-
assessment looking across possible consequences and a guard-rail approach is more thoughtful, 
reasoned, broad-ranging and robust. And it is clearly seen as a reasonable and rational approach by 
the body-politic. 
We know what kind of emissions paths we have to follow to get there, i.e. holding to 1.5°C. But 
emissions are currently way off track for such paths. Global greenhouse gas emissions rose in 2019 for 
the third consecutive year, reaching a record high of 59.1 GtCO2e (including land-use change) (UNEP, 
2020). Although annual emissions decreased sharply in 2020 due to the global response to the COVID 
pandemic, December 2020 global CO2 emissions had already rebounded to above December 2019 
levels (IEA, 2021a). Returning to Figure 1, we can see that world emissions must start turning down 
now and continue to drop sharply. To get from current levels of close to 60 GtCO2e a year, down to net-
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zero by mid-century, we have to change fundamentally the way we do things. And we have to do that 
everywhere, across all sectors, across all countries. We cannot be confident that there will be net-
negatives in large quantities5, so we must strive for net-zero across the board.  
2.2 Urgency 
The next decade is critical. Choices made on infrastructure and capital now will either lock us in to high 
emissions, or set us on a low-carbon growth path which can be sustainable and inclusive. In the next 
15-20 years infrastructure will roughly double; in the next 20-25 years the world economy will probably 
double; and in the next 40 years the urban population will likely double. If that new infrastructure, the 
new world economy, or the towns and cities we build look anything like the old, we will have no hope of 
meeting the objectives of the Paris Agreement. The infrastructure we build in the next 15- 20 years will 
be decided in the next few years. That is why we have to act quickly. A sense of urgency is absolutely 
critical in our decision making.  
2.3 A new form of growth 
The necessary rapid change across the whole system, just described, can be a story of growth, indeed 
the only sustainable story of growth. In the shorter term, the necessary investments can boost demand 
in a world where planned savings exceed planned investments (with sluggish demand and low real 
interest rates). In the short and medium term it is full of innovation, investment, discovery, and new 
ways of doing things. It can be more efficient; and much cleaner. It can create cities where we can move 
and breathe, and ecosystems which are robust and fruitful. It is potentially a very attractive, different 
way of doing things, relative to past dirty models, with so many gains across the different dimensions 
of well-being. But that does not mean that it is easy. It does mean that it is sensible, it does mean that 
it is attractive, and it is within our grasp. We have to change radically and, particularly, invest and 
innovate strongly to get there. That is the challenge. But there can be a real payoff in terms of a much 
better form of growth. We must also remember that there is unlikely to be a long-run growth story that 
 
5 We can and should create negative emissions by building our natural capital, e.g. restoring degraded land and expanding our 
forests. And we should work intensively on possibilities for “air capture” to bring down costs, and to examine potential for scale. 
8 
 
is high carbon; it would likely create, the IPCC reports show, a physical environment so hostile as to 
derail growth and undermine living standards across the board.  
Can it be done?  The answer is ‘yes’ and in particular there are four forces at this current moment which 
are particularly favourable to moving quickly and on scale: low interest rates, rapid technological change 
(see section 2.4), international understandings coming together (including the UNFCCC, COP21, the 
Paris agreement of 2015 and more than 100 countries covering 61% of emissions committing to net-
zero by mid-century (Black, et al., 2021)), and pressure from the young people of the world to change 
(for example, Fridays for the Future and strong activity in the universities of the world).  
2.4 Rapid technological change  
Technology has changed very rapidly over the last 15 years or so. A whole range of low-emission 
technologies, that are already competitive with fossil-fuel based technologies without subsidy or a 
carbon price, have emerged. Capital costs for renewable electricity continue to fall much faster than 
those for conventional technologies and many electric vehicle technologies are now close to cost-
competitive with their fossil-fuel counterparts (see Figures 2 and 3). 




Figure 3: Lithium-ion battery pack price reduction and global battery electric vehicle stock 
 
Sources: BNEF (2019), IEA (2020) 
The pace of these advances in technology and reductions in cost has been much faster than expected. 
For example, since 2001, the International Energy Agency (IEA) has consistently underestimated the 
rate at which the cost of solar Photo Voltaic (PV) would subsequently fall, in its World Energy Output 
(WEO) reports (Ives et al., 2021) – see Figure 4. These costs of the new cleaner technologies are falling 
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Figure 4: Actual versus IEA projected LCOE of solar PV  
  
Source: Ives et al. (2021). 
With falling costs of clean technologies, estimates of the ‘cost’ of the transition to net-zero have been 
consistently reduced. The UK’s Climate Change Committee (CCC) has been producing estimates of 
the investments, costs and resource savings associated with the UK’s pathway to net-zero. Their 2020 
analysis suggests that the annualised resource cost6 of reducing GHG emissions to net-zero would be 
approximately 0.5% of GDP in 2050 (CCC, 2020). This is lower than the estimate the CCC produced in 
2019, which put the annual cost of meeting the net-zero by 2050 target at 1-2% of GDP in 2050. Further, 
the estimate they produced in 2008 put the annual cost of meeting a much weaker target, reducing 
emissions by 80% by 2050 (relative to 1990), at a similar 1-2% of GDP in 2050 (CCC, 2019).   
At the time of the Stern Review (2006) we estimated costs of 1-2% GDP per annum for reducing 
emissions (globally) by 80% (comparing 1990 and 2050). It has been argued that the last few percent 
would be particularly costly (that is embodied in the modelling of many Integrated Assessment Models). 
 
6 Annualised resource costs are estimated by adding up costs and savings from carbon abatement measures and comparing 
them to resources costs in an alternative scenario of no-further-climate-action (CCC, 2020). 
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Now we have estimates (in the case of the UK) below 1% of GDP for going to net-zero emissions by 
2050. The changes in estimates reflect real changes in costs and fairly modest assumptions (in relation 
to experience) of future cost changes - technical progress continues rapidly. There are strong 
economies of scale in production and discovery, which with clarity in policy direction, will drive change.  
Low-carbon technologies are already competitive with fossil-fuel based alternatives in the power sector. 
In 2020, solar/wind was the cheapest form of new power generation7 in countries representing over 
70% of GDP (Systemiq, 2020). And renewable energy technologies are expected to continue to decline 
in cost. Reductions in upfront capital costs will be driven by innovations around efficiency and new 
methods, more competitive global supply chains and economies of scale, while reductions in total 
levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) generation will be driven by increasing capacity factors and declining 
operational and financing costs (ETC, 2021). By 2030, low-carbon technologies and business models 
could be competitive in sectors representing over 70% of global emissions (today 25%) (Systemiq, 
2020), without carbon tax or subsidy. In addition to the adoption of low-carbon technologies, the IEA’s 
global pathway to net‐zero emissions by 2050 projects that around 8% of emissions reductions will 
need to be achieved from behavioural changes and materials efficiency. The absence of behavioural 
changes to reduce energy demand in transport, buildings and industry, would increase the costs and 
difficulty of achieving net‐zero by 2050 substantially (IEA, 2021b). 
Further, there are immense benefits beyond the fundamental contribution of radically reducing the risks 
of climate change. As we have noted, these include cities where we can move and breathe and be 
more productive, and ecosystems which are robust and fruitful. We can find, and are finding, great 
advances in resource (including energy) efficiency. And, crucially, we can strongly reduce deaths and 
damage to health from air and other pollution – around 15% of world deaths in 2018 were linked to air 
pollution associated with the burning of fossil fuels (Vohra et al., 2021). 
 
7 Based on the levelised cost of electricity (LCOE). LCOE is the average offtake price needed across a project lifetime for a 
developer to meet its equity hurdle rate of return (BloombergNEF, 2020).  
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In summary, in this section I have explained why we have to change, the degree to which we have to 
change, why it is feasible, and the very attractive new form of growth and development that this change 
could bring.  
3. The first decades of this century, the COVID crisis, and the climate crisis 
We are at a very special moment in history, facing two crises:  the COVID crisis that we are experiencing 
right now (summer of 2021)- we hope shorter-term, although that itself depends on strong global action 
- and the climate crisis, which is going to stay with us for a long time. The climate crisis embodies risks 
and challenges that are bigger, deeper and longer-lasting even than the tragic COVID crisis. There are 
powerful arguments that we have to tackle these crises in a similar way; with strong, innovative 
investment, to drive a recovery and create a new form of development and growth. But in assessing 
ways forward we must begin with the first two decades of this century and paths of investment and 
growth. 
3.1 The decades before COVID 
The first decade of this century saw fairly steady growth paths and rates of investment (as a proportion 
of output) for the world as a whole, see Figures 5 and 6. But this average conceals falling rates in 67 
countries and rising rates for China (and a few other emerging market countries), where investment 
rates moved up strongly. For China it was a decade where output more than doubled and territorial 
emissions rose by 132% (WRI, 2021).   
Growth rates and investment rates plunged across the world during the global financial crisis (2007-
2009) and, for the most part, had not, in the second decade of this century up to COVID, recovered the 
levels of 2000. China was the exception where investment rates have been fairly steady in the second 
decade, up to the COVID crisis, although China’s growth rate was substantially lower in the second, 
relative to the first, decade. 
The experiences in the richer (G7) countries over the last few decades have led to a revival of the idea 
of secular stagnation (Summers, 2013, 2021), first raised by Hansen in 1938 (Hansen, 1938). This 
pattern of lower investment rates (see Figure 5) and lower growth (see Figure 6) was important 
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background to the challenges of social cohesion and populism (Tabellini, 2019) which emerged during 
the second decade. There was also some faltering, particularly under President Trump8, of 
internationalism. This was in addition to rising emissions and severe loss of biodiversity (Dasgupta, 
2021). It was a decade, following the global financial crisis, of increasing problems. Broadly speaking, 
the economic and social conditions across the world during the decades before the COVID crisis, were 
troubling. 
Figure 5: Investment rates in the decades before COVID 
Source: IMF (2021). 
  
 
8 Under the Trump administration, the United States left the Paris Agreement on climate change, pulled out of the Iran nuclear 
deal, withdrew its membership in UNESCO, set in motion a process of exiting the World Health Organization, blocked the 
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Figure 6: GDP growth in the decades before COVID 
 
Source: IMF (2021). 
However, in the decade prior to COVID, the response to climate change was building. The Paris Climate 
Agreement of 2015 was a major advance in international commitment and agreement; further, 2015 
was also the year of the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which encapsulated 
a broader and deeper perspective on development (and provided relevant indicators), than the 
Millennium Development Goals which had come before. We were also beginning to see and understand 
a new approach to development and to growth that could be more efficient and better environmentally, 
and constitute a very attractive, inclusive and resilient growth story, if we got it right (Stern, 2015; NCE, 
2018; OECD, 2018).  
In the last few years, private firm after private firm has committed to net-zero emissions (Black et al., 
2021). The Central Banks have been working together via the Network on Greening the Financial 
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of the Exchequer enhanced the remit of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to include climate 
change. There is a Coalition of Finance Ministers on Climate Action, which is building momentum. 
All this is being reflected in investment. For example, global annual renewable power capacity 
expansion exceeded non-renewable capacity expansion every year from 2015-2019 (IRENA, 2020). 
Thus, in international agreements, in the private sector, in central banks, in finance ministries and in 
real investment, fundamental change is building. 
But now, with COVID, we are in a deep crisis; of health, of employment, of investment and increasingly 
of finance and debt in many countries. The costs in terms of human life are tragic, the risks of an 
extended slowing of growth, or depression, are real, and the developing world is facing the danger of a 
lost decade of development.  
3.2 Tackling the twin crises and creating a new internationalism 
Tackling the two crises requires a new and shared understanding of how to reconstruct our economies 
and societies and the meaning of “build back better”. That understanding should be based on a 
recognition of the nature and origins of the fragilities and difficulties that had been growing before the 
COVID crisis broke over us. Rebuilding in a different way will involve substantial investment and 
innovation, and the global nature of the challenges demands international collaboration.  
There have always been arguments for internationalism; in our current circumstances they are 
extraordinarily powerful. The twin crises and multi-polar world, including the continuing rise of Asia, are 
changing both the challenges and structures of internationalism. Our ways of collaborating will need to 
develop. However, a shared understanding of the great returns to collaboration associated with the 
current challenges and context could help both build internationalism and spur change. 
The returns to collaboration in current circumstances can be expressed in terms of four wins. The first 
is that we face high unemployment in many countries of the world and we need to expand demand9. 
Expanding demand in countries simultaneously has a much more powerful effect than expanding 
 
9 In some countries supply has been curtailed along with demand. 
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demand in just one country, because increasing demand in one country spills over to boost employment 
in others. Second, we have to reset expectations, not only for growth but also for a different kind of 
growth. If we reset those expectations together, then investors will know that the investments they are 
considering are of a kind that are going to be in harmony with the movement of demand around the 
world. A third win is that if there is a shared understanding of the direction of new technologies then we 
will create increasing returns to scale in production and discovery. We have already seen (see Section 
2) that very powerfully in the way in which costs of solar and wind power have been driven down; the 
same is happening now with batteries; and electric vehicle costs are going to fall very quickly. The 
overall scale of technology deployment, achieved by acting together, can generate big returns. The 
fourth win comes from climate and biodiversity being global public goods. If we emit less greenhouse 
gases in one country, then all other countries gain from that drop in emissions: similarly protecting and 
regenerating biodiversity benefits us all.  
Working together is, therefore, of fundamental importance, perhaps now more than any time in history. 
Some of this should play through via international mechanisms such as the UN, OECD, G20, G7. Many 
players will be involved in creating responses to the immense issues of COVID and climate; the private 
sector, the multilateral development banks and international financial institutions, and the ministries of 
finance and the central banks all have central roles.  
4. Realising investment for a strong and sustainable recovery 
4.1 Investment 
In section 3, I explained why strong, internationally coordinated investment should be at centre stage, 
right through from recovery from the COVID pandemic to transformational growth and the drive to a 
net-zero economy. What kind of orders of magnitude of investment do we need to make?  To bring 
through the new ways of doing things and the new technologies required to make that happen, we have 
to increase investment by around 2-3 percentage points of GDP across the world, relative to the 
previous decade - more in some places, less in others – as well as change the composition of 
investment (in China, however, it is not a question of raising investment rates but changing the 
composition of investment). Many of these new technologies involve pulling capital increases forward, 
along with investing in different ways. Renewable electricity, for example, requires upfront investment 
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whereas fuel cost savings are realised once the renewable technologies are operational. Importantly, 
these investments should not be seen narrowly in terms of extra costs from going “clean”; many of them 
have tremendous returns in terms of greater efficiency, cleaner air, better health and more. But an 
increase in the investment rate by 2-3 percentage points of GDP is needed to realise these gains, to 
recover sustainability and to put us on a new path.  
This estimate of the magnitude of the necessary boost to global investment can be arrived at from a 
number of different perspectives. First, for the world excluding China, it would take us back to the level 
of investment seen three or so decades ago (Figure 5 and IMF, 2021), and help to restore growth rates 
and productivity improvements. Second, there has been a persistent gap in infrastructure spending in 
both developed and developing economies, in terms of what is necessary to support growth and 
development, that has been estimated at 2 - 3% of global GDP (New Climate Economy, 2016; 
Bhattacharya et al., 2019). Third, we can examine the specifics of the needs and significant 
opportunities for scaling up the sustainable investments necessary to accelerate the transition to a low-
carbon and climate-resilient economy, and restore natural capital. These investments are examined 
and quantified in a number of recent reports (ETC, 2021; IEA, 2021b; Stern, 2021). These three 
approaches are not additive, they are different ways of looking at the issue, but they all point to numbers 
in a similar range. 
At the country level, the necessary increase in investment will vary according to level of development 
and circumstances. For the G7 countries, a 2 percentage-point step-up in investment, relative to the 
past decade, would partly reverse earlier declines driven in part by cuts in public investment. For many 
Emerging Market and Developing Countries (EMDEs), these necessary magnitudes will likely be higher 
than 2 percentage points, given the range of investments, particularly around infrastructure, required to 
meet development goals. For China, as noted, the main challenge will be to change the composition 
rather than the level of investment . 
Such an investment programme could overcome the secular stagnation that has been experienced 
around the world over the last decade or so. From a basic Keynesian macro perspective, this was 
associated with planned investment being too small in relation to planned saving. The obvious solution, 
then, is to increase planned investment, in the light of the urgent requests we have described. From 
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this perspective, we can overcome secular stagnation by investing in new, and environmentally 
necessary, ways of doing things, thereby not only restoring demand but also charting a much more 
attractive form of growth.  
4.2 Policy 
These increases in investment, will require strong policy and a positive investment climate, including 
the functioning of relevant governmental institutions. Further, the many relevant market failures (see 
section 7b) and the urgency of change indicate the necessity of a whole range of policy instruments. 
Carbon pricing will be important, but alone it will not be enough. Complementary policies, including city 
design, regulation and standards, and investments in R&D, will also be needed.  
Investment seeks returns over the medium and long term and requires clear and credible signals.  
However, circumstances change and learning occurs, and that means policy will be revised; but it 
should occur in ways that are “predictably flexible”. Thus, policy revisions, as lessons are learned, 
systems change and technologies advance, must be carried through in ways that people understand, 
and which can be anticipated. For example, it can be announced that an emerging technology will be 
supported initially but as it moves out, or “diffuses”, into the productive world, or as the cost of the new 
technology falls, its supporting subsidy will be reduced. Predictable flexibility has been a principle of 
monetary policy for some time, but it should be applied across the board; otherwise confidence in policy 
is undermined, policy risk is seen as pervasive, and investment is discouraged. Government-induced 
policy risk is one of the major deterrents to investment worldwide, particularly around infrastructure 
(World Bank, 2004; WEF, 2014; Baker et al., 2015; OECD, 2015; World Bank, 2020; World Bank, 2021). 
4.3 Finance 
Investment and innovation inevitably involve a certain amount of risk. Strong and rapid increases in 
investment might be seen as particularly risky, especially around infrastructure where early stage risk 
can be severe and the reliability of long-term revenue streams can be problematic. The necessary 
investment can be realised only with the right kind of finance, in the right place, at the right time, which 
can help reduce, share and manage the risk. Across the world there are great investment potential and 
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strong savings. But there are important difficulties in turning opportunities into real investment 
programmes; good policies and social institutions have a powerful role to play. 
Further, getting the right kind of finance, in the right place, at the right time is not easy. Mobilising private 
sector finance, at scale, will be critical. But there will also be a need for development finance and 
concessional finance to support the activities that do not quickly generate strong revenue streams or 
have high risks. The international financial institutions, especially the multilateral development banks, 
and including the IMF, have a crucial role to play. This is a moment - with the crises of COVID and 
climate, the criticality of raising investment, the centrality of rapid change, and the importance of 
internationalism - to expand and strengthen our international financial institutions. In doing so, we 
should expect them to ramp up their support for developing investment programmes, expand their 
finance for investment, and expect them to ramp up and reorient their activities towards sustainability. 
It would be a “grand bargain” with great potential rewards for the world10. 
5. What we have learned since the Stern Review 
In the light of the policy analyses and arguments set out above, it is interesting to ask how issues and 
understanding have moved on since the publication of The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern 
Review (Stern, 2006) in October 2006. Fifteen years on, the review’s core finding – that the costs of 
inaction on climate change are much greater than the costs of action – which was compelling then, in 
my view, is now still stronger. First, the science is ever more worrying. Greenhouse gas emissions 
have continued to rise. There is evidence that the impacts of climate change are happening faster and 
with greater intensity than expected. We can see ever more clearly that there are significant risks of 
major areas, with currently large populations, becoming unliveable; thus the risks of mass migration 
and conflict look increasingly severe. Each IPCC report over the last three decades has looked more 
worrying. The IPCC 2018 report showed how much more dangerous 2oC is than 1.5oC. And the Sixth 
Assessment Report of the IPCC on the physical science, published in August 2021, paints a still more 
difficult picture; time is running out for strong and decisive action if we are to hold temperature 
increases to 1.5oC. 
 
10 For more on these issues, see Stern (2021) and Bhattacharya et al. (2021).  
20 
 
Second, clean energy technologies have been developing at pace, with costs falling further and faster 
than expected. Any reasonable estimate of the costs of inaction would be still higher, and the costs of 
action lower than in 2006.  
Third, the politics, have sometimes moved forward strongly (e.g. UNFCCC, COP21, Paris, 2015) and 
sometimes backwards (e.g. the election of Presidents Trump and Bolsonaro). The global financial 
crises of 2008 and 2010 reduced “bandwidth” for climate change. More recently there have been 
strong positives politically, for example, China’s commitment to carbon neutrality by 2060, the 
intensification of action in the EU, and in the USA following the election of President Biden. The 
private sector has started to engage strongly. 
Fifth, analytically our understanding and focus have moved to emphasise still more strongly the 
dynamics of change (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Aghion et al., 2016; Van der Meijden and Smulders, 
2017; Systemiq, 2020; Ives et al., 2021). We can now point to new and much more attractive models 
of development than were followed in the past. We can look to a new story of growth, indeed the drive 
to net-zero can be the sustainable, inclusive and resilient growth story of the 21st century. The deeper 
understanding of the problem, in terms of dynamics of development and of breadth of potential 
benefits, implies that we have to deepen our economic analysis. This is the subject of Part II of this 
lecture.   
Part II 
6. How economics must change 
An assessment of what the current situation demands of us, particularly for this decade, was set out in 
Part I. That requires changing our ways of producing and consuming, rapidly and fundamentally, and 
creating the investment, innovation, sets of policies, and the finance that could foster and support the 
change. How can we bring our economics to bear in a way that informs those very real and urgent 
problems?  How can we use economic analysis to tell us as much as it possibly can about why to do 
this, how to do this, and the methods and policy instruments we should use? In this section I will focus, 
in terms of broad analytical approaches, on where we are in the economics discipline on climate change 
and argue that it is time for change in the economics of climate change and, in some respects, 
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economics generally. In the following section, 7, I will argue that our subject does have much to offer in 
applying our existing tools and in developing new perspectives and analyses, but we must be innovative 
and, as a profession, engage much more strongly on this, the biggest issue of our times.  
6.1 Some history of the economics of climate change 
A natural starting point is the important set of insights of economists Alfred Marshall and Arthur Pigou. 
At the end of the 19th century, Marshall (Marshall, 1890) drew attention to the potential difference 
between marginal private cost and marginal social cost. Thirty years later, Pigou (Pigou, 1920) argued 
for a tax, equal to the difference between the marginal private cost and the marginal social cost, to 
correct for an externality, where that is the source of the difference11.  
Around 60 or 70 years ago, Ronald Coase began considering these concepts in a different way, 
emphasising institutional arrangements (Coase, 1960). He spoke of allocating property rights and 
establishing markets so that there could be trade in externalities. James Meade - his work ‘Trade and 
Welfare’ (Meade, 1955) was a landmark - also wrote very insightfully about the theory of externalities, 
including integrating externalities into the theory of reform, bringing in distributional issues and looking 
at general equilibrium in multi-good models. Coming forward further, and looking at applications 30 or 
so years ago, David Pearce, for example, was writing ‘Blueprint for a Green Economy’, emphasising 
how the Pigouvian idea could be implemented (Pearce et al., 1989).  
This is all a very important and valuable part of our intellectual history in economics. Then climate 
change came along with an explicit and very large problem. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change was established, as a result of initiatives from scientists, in 1988, and climate change started 
to become a more active subject in discussions of policy. There was growing recognition that climate 
change could be disruptive, but at that time the common belief was that our emissions of greenhouse 
gases would cause only small perturbations at some point in the future. The modelling of climate change 
began with Bill Nordhaus' important and admirable paper ‘To slow or not to slow?’, published in the 
Economic Journal in 1991 (Nordhaus, 1991) and Bill Cline published his book ‘The Economics of Global 
 
11 There could be other sources, such as monopoly power, missing markets, asymmetric markets, market failures in other 
markets, and so on. 
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Warming’ in 1992 (Cline, 1992). Nordhaus’s question, recognising that there could be potential dangers 
from climate change and that emissions arose from activities around producing and consuming, was 
‘should we grow a little less fast than we might have envisaged before we thought about climate 
change?’. He proceeded in a sensible way, taking an emerging problem and applying the standard tools 
of economics: first the Pigouvian story of marginal social costs, marginal private costs, and taxing for 
the externality; second on growth, he used the framework of a standard exogenous growth model and 
considered the impact of climate change largely in terms of small perturbations around the underlying 
growth path(s). That was a sensible early contribution for the economics of climate change.  
Over the following 10-15 years, it became more and more clear that climate change is not a marginal 
problem. We are dealing with a challenge involving huge potential disruptions, which requires very 
radical changes in our production systems and ways of consuming. That simply cannot be picked up 
by assuming a fairly standard underlying model of exogenous growth and, within that model, portraying 
climate change in terms of marginal damages of just a few percent of GDP. Nordhaus’ DICE model 
launched a major literature on integrated assessment models (IAMs), and their scope has been 
expanded. But the basic underlying features of optimisation of explicit, calibrated social welfare 
functions, underlying exogenous growth and aggregation (usually to one good) impose severe limitation 
on their ability to illuminate two basic questions. The first is how to approach analytically the challenge 
of managing immense risk, which could involve loss of life on a massive scale. The second is how to 
chart and guide a response to this challenge which will involve fundamental structural change across a 
whole complex economy. These two issues are at the core of economic policy on climate. The basic 
structure of IAMs, I shall argue, even with the many advances and mutations that have been offered, is 
not of a form which can tackle these two questions in any satisfactory way.  
There is a problem in the profession, which goes beyond the way IAMs are structured and specified, 
associated with an inability or unwillingness to move much beyond the static Pigouvian or 20th century 
approach to externalities in analysing the challenges of climate change. Many discussions of policy 
suggest that “economic theory says” that policy should be overwhelmingly about a carbon price. A 
carbon price should indeed be at centre stage, but we need so much more in terms of policy and 
perspectives, and understanding of the issues. However, we must be clear that the suggestion that 
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“theory says” that the carbon price is the most effective route is simply wrong and involves a number of 
mistakes. 
The first mistake is that there is a whole collection of market failures and market absences of great 
relevance beyond the greenhouse gas externality (see section 7). The second is that under the 
temperature target or guardrail approach (see section1), the choice of carbon prices is focused on its 
role, in combination with other policies, in incentivising paths which achieve the overall target (such as 
net-zero emissions by mid-century to fit with the temperature target) with as much economic advantage 
as possible. Such prices are not simply the marginal social cost as in Pigou (see discussion of Stern-
Stiglitz Commission below, this section). Third, where the risks of moving too slowly are potentially very 
large and there are increasing returns to scale and fixed costs in key industries, then regulations can 
help reduce uncertainty and bring down costs (e.g. Weitzman, 1974). Fourth, many consumers, 
producers, cities, and countries, recognise the obligation to act, and are not blinkered, narrow optimisers 
with a view of utility focused only on their own consumption. Fifth, much of the challenge of action is 
how to promote collaboration and act together. This poses a whole set of important questions around 
institutions and actions for mutual support. This is an immense challenge concerning risk, values, 
dynamics and collaboration, and the narrow Pigouvian model, useful though it is,is very far from the 
whole story. 
6.2 Some problems with IAMs 
To explain my argument concerning the failures of IAMs in relation to these two questions, I will set out, 
in broad terms, some of the basic structure and specifications in standard IAMs. There is an underlying 
one-good growth model where emissions depend on output, accumulated emissions cause temperature 
increase and climate change, and emissions can be reduced by incurring costs. However, much of this 
literature, which has dominated so much work on the economics of climate change, has been 
misleading and biased against strong action, because climate damage specifications are implausibly 
low and costs of action implausibly high, and subject to diminishing returns. For example, a recent 
version of the DICE model estimates losses of 8.5% of current GDP at a global temperature rise of 6°C 
(Nordhaus, 2017). If this were plausible, there would be little cause for concern because 6°C of warming 
will not be reached, even with bad luck, probably for over 100 years, by which point, with a modest 
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amount of economic growth, losing less than ten percentage points of GDP would be of minor 
significance in relation to GDP which had more than doubled (at say an underlying growth rate of 1% 
p.a.). But a 6°C temperature rise would likely be deeply dangerous, indeed existential for hundreds of 
millions, or billions, of people. It could be a world that could support a far lower population, and we could 
see deaths on a huge scale, migration of billions of people, and severe conflicts around the world, as 
large areas, many densely populated currently, became more or less uninhabitable as a result of 
submersion, desertification, storm surge and extreme events, or because the heat was so intense for 
extended periods that humans could not survive outdoors. It is profoundly implausible that numbers 
around 10% of GDP offer a sensible description of the kind of disruption and catastrophe that 6°C of 
warming could cause. We cannot be sure of the probabilities of different scales of catastrophe, but it 
would seem deeply unwise, indeed reckless, to assume that catastrophe of immense proportions would 
not be associated with temperature increases of this magnitude. 
Most standard IAMs also embody diminishing returns to scale and increasing marginal costs of action 
to reduce emissions, plus modest rates of technical progress (relative to those experienced in the last 
decade or so). These features are very problematic because we have already seen how important 
increasing returns to scale and very rapid change in technology are in this context. Costs of solar power 
and LEDs have plummeted as the world has scaled up investment and innovation in cleaner 
technologies (as we saw in section 2). The same is happening with batteries and electric vehicles, and 
is likely to happen with hydrogen. By embodying diminishing returns and modest technical progress, 
the IAMs systematically overstate the costs of climate action. Further, they distort the theory of policy 
which is much more complex when we have increasing returns to scale; particularly in the context of 
risk. Standard optimising policy models which focus on “marginal cost equals marginal benefit” are far 
more tractable with diminishing returns and increasing marginal costs to action, but by choosing model 
assumptions primarily for tractability and convenience, we risk severely disturbing the policy discussion 
at issue. 
Some of the flaws and biases described above and embodied in the standard IAMs can be mitigated 
with different assumptions, and there have been some valuable and relevant contributions in the 
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literature12.  But, and this point is crucial, there are deeper problems with the general approach of 
maximising a social welfare function (for example, based on expected utility) in the presence of extreme 
risk, which cannot be corrected by adjusting functions and parameters. The stakes we are playing for 
are absolutely immense. Standard utility or welfare functions at the heart of the IAMs cannot capture 
adequately the nature and scale of the risks from climate change, and the challenges of immense risk 
to life itself for many, points towards the need for alternative strategies for building theories and models. 
Impacts which can involve deaths of billions are not easily captured in the standard social welfare 
functions, which we used in most IAMs (and more broadly), involving aggregation of individual utility 
functions. Indeed, as Weitzman argued (Weitzman, 2009, 2012) standard approaches quickly run into 
problems of utility functions going to minus infinity. There can be arbitrary “fixes”, for example by putting 
bounds on utility, but it is an indication that the model has lost touch with the problem.  
With immense risk, rapidly developing clean technologies, and increasing returns to scale, it can be 
argued (and see section 2) that the sensible, consequentialist approach to such immense risk is to put 
in place targets or guardrails (e.g. temperature increase of 1.5°C) and then think about how to keep 
within them. This was the approach taken within the Paris agreement (UNFCCC, COP21, 2015).  
Just as with the social welfare function aspect of IAMs, there is a deeper question on the production 
side of the modelling. The policy challenge, as we have seen, involves generating rapid and major 
change in key complex systems, including energy, transport, cities and land, over a very short period. 
Simple “cost” functions for emissions reductions, even if made more realistic, do not get to grips with 
the real policy challenges of how to make these changes. 
 
12 Dietz & Stern (2016) show that if the DICE model is modified to take more strongly into account three essential elements of 
the climate problem – the endogeneity of growth, the convexity of damage and climate risk – optimal policy comprises strong 
controls. Hänsel et al. (2020) show that adjusting the parameters of DICE, to reflect the latest findings on economic damage 
functions, some of the latest climate science and a broad range of expert recommendations on the pure rate of time preference 
and the elasticity of marginal utility, as elicited by Drupp et al. (2018), brings the economically ‘optimal’ climate policy path in 
line with UN climate goals. Schumacher (2018) has demonstrated how equity weighting can lead to significantly higher global 
damages from climate change than those reported by unmodified IAMs. Moore and Diaz (2015) show that implementing 
temperature effects on GDP growth rates in DICE results in optimal climate policy that stabilizes global temperature change 
below 2 °C. Explicit modelling of adaptation in IAMs shows that joint implementation of mitigation and adaptation is welfare 
improving (de Bruin et al. 2009; Bosello et al. 2010). Work by Carleton and Hsiang (2016), Ciscar et al. (2019) and others feed 
into better calibration of damage functions. Climate and social tipping points have been incorporated into IAMs (see e.g. Cai et 
al 2016; Grubler et al. 2018; Yumashev et al. 2019). Completely different approaches to IAMs are under development, e.g. 
analytical IAMs (Gerlagh and Liski, 2018a; Gerlagh and Liski, 2018b; Golosov et al., 2014; Hassler and Krusell, 2012; Hassler 
et al., 2018; Iverson and Karp, 2017; Karp, 2017; Rezai and van der Ploeg, 2016; Traeger, 2018) and agent-based IAMs 
(Czupryna et al., 2020; Lamperti et al., 2018).  
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The Stern-Stiglitz Commission looked at the implementation of a target-based approach, in that it 
examined price profiles of carbon that could lead, over time, using markets and a range of government 
climate interventions, to achievement of the goals of the Paris Agreement.  The 2017 report of the 
Commission suggested CO2 prices of $50-100 per tonne, for 2030 (Stern and Stiglitz, 2017)13. These 
are prices which guide production decisions rather than prices based on marginal damages. In simple, 
perfectly competitive models which are fully optimised, the prices to guide production would be equal 
to marginal damages. But we are in a world with many market imperfections, with major risks, requiring 
fundamental systemic change, and where optimisation is difficult to define, let alone achieve. Thus, 
such equality cannot plausibly be assumed to be a general feature of appropriate policy. As Stern-
Stiglitz emphasise (and see section 7 below), the kind of change we require will need a whole range of 
complementary policies if it is to deliver the necessary change in a satisfactory way.  
6.3 Discounting 
A further challenge for the economics of climate change, that is not just an issue for the IAMs, but arises 
as a key question in formulating approaches to major, intertemporal problems, is discounting. The 
discussion of discounting around climate change has been, in my view, somewhat weak and often not 
well-founded in basic theory. 
The important concept to consider here is the social discount factor, 𝜆𝜆: the relative social evaluation of 
an extra unit of account (e.g. consumption) in the future, relative to an extra unit now. In economics we 
generally use relative prices, here shadow prices, to guide choices, decisions or trade-offs. The 
proportional rate of fall of the social discount factor is the social discount rate.  
In a simple aggregative framework without uncertainty, the social discount factor can be described by 
the Ramsey equation. 
 
13 A related approach is taken by Kaufman et al. (2020), who estimate the CO2 prices needed in the near term for consistency 
with a net-zero CO2 emissions by 2050 target. They arrive at estimates, in their model based on marginal damages, of US$34 - 
US$64 per tonne in 2025 and US$77 - US$124 in 2030. The IMF have proposed $75 a tonne by 2030 (IMF, 2019). More recent 
work looks at the possibilities of price differentials across different countries (IMF/OECD, 2021). 
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The social discount factor is the primary logical concept and it can be misleading to jump too quickly to 
a focus on its rate of change without examining carefully what should shape the primary concept itself 
(see below): 
 - ?̇?𝜆  / 𝜆𝜆 = ηg + δ,  
where social utility is a function of consumption, η is the elasticity of social marginal utility of 
consumption, g is the growth rate of consumption and δ is the pure-time discount rate. The definition of 
pure-time discounting is the attaching of a lower weight to individuals and their associated utility simply 
because they occur in the future; it is the discounting of individuals or utilities because they occur later 
(and not because of any assumption about consumption levels).  
It is the social discount factor, 𝜆𝜆, the relative shadow price, that is the important concept to focus on. 
The essence of intertemporal valuation is embodied, on the margin, by this relative shadow price. Under 
most, or many at least, systems of value, relative valuation will depend on judgement from two 
perspectives. The first concerns the levels of living in the future, relative to now. How much you judge 
the value of units of consumption or income in the future, relative to now, depends on how well-off you 
think those in the future will be then. That is endogenous because how well off they will be depends on 
what we do now. This relative shadow price depends on our decisions and is not exogenous to them. 
This is of particular importance in this context, because if we act recklessly on climate change, future 
generations could be much poorer than ours. 
The second concerns how much you value future generations relative to this generation, irrespective 
of what they might consume or produce. Pure-time discounting is essentially discrimination by date of 
birth. Other than the possibility of extinction (for example, from an asteroid crashing into the earth), 
which is something that you can build directly into the analysis, there is no serious ethical argument in 
favour of pure-time discounting (see Stern, 2015; chapters 5 and 6 for an extended discussion of the 
issues and key references; also the pair of articles in the Journal of Economics and Philosophy (Stern, 
2014a and 2014b)14.  
 
14 For a rather mathematical account of some relevant issues, see Chichilnisky et al (2020). 
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Finally, on discounting, we must note that there is little point in looking for ethical values relevant to 
social discounting in capital markets, because capital markets: (i) do not reflect ethical social decisions; 
(ii) they embody expectations and views about risk that are hard to identify; and (iii) they involve many 
imperfections. Nevertheless, one often seems to hear the mistaken argument that social preferences 
can be derived from these markets. 
7. New approaches to the economics of climate change  
I have tried to explain the limitations of the IAMs in tackling the big questions at issue: the understanding 
and management of extreme risk and of rapid structural change. So, what are good approaches to the 
economics of climate change? We are going to need a suite of different models, a variety of 
perspectives, and a collection of different ways of understanding different parts of the problem. And 
then good judgement in putting all these pieces together.  
Economic analyses of climate change must first capture extreme risk, including possible large-scale 
and unforeseeable consequences. Second, they should recognise that many key markets have 
critically important failures (beyond that of the GHG externality), that crucial markets may be absent, 
and that there are limits on the ability of government to “correct” these market failures or absences. 
Third, they should embody rapid technical and systemic change, often in very large and complex 
systems such as cities, energy, transport, and land use, and allow for increasing returns to scale. 
Fourth, they should examine rapid changes in (endogenously determined) beliefs and preferences; 
and fifth, take into account distributive impacts and risks, both at a moment in time and over time, and 
including those associated with structural change.  All of this will unavoidably involve explicit analysis 
and discussion of value judgements. These components, or sets of questions, are difficult to 
incorporate in standard integrated assessment modelling, but are at the core of the issues around 
understanding policy towards climate change. We must deepen our economic analysis to incorporate 
them. We should also recognise that questions embodied in, or similar to, these components arise in 
many other parts of economics, where major risks and fundamental change are at the core of the 
challenge under examination. Thus, the issues we are raising here on understanding policy towards 
major challenges concern economics as a whole, and not just the economics of climate change. 
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It is not possible in the space here to develop arguments around all the areas just described. By way of 
example, and an important one, I will delve a little deeper into market imperfections. Table 1 outlines 
six important failures that policy design must take into account. These different market failures point to 
the use of different instruments, but the collection should be mutually reinforcing. These failures interact. 
Table 1: Six market imperfections relevant for tackling climate change15 
Market Failure Description Policy Options 
Greenhouse gasses (GHGs) Negative externality because 
of the damage that emissions 
inflict on others.  
Carbon tax/ cap-and-trade/ 
regulation of GHG emissions 
(standards). 
Research, development and 
deployment (R,D & D) 
Supporting innovation and 
dissemination.  
Tax breaks, support for 
demonstration/deployment, 
publicly funded research.  
Imperfection in risk/capital 
markets 
Imperfect information 
assessment of risks; 
understanding of new 
projects/technologies. 
Risk sharing/reduction through 
guarantees, long-term 
contracts; convening power for 
co-financing.  
Networks Coordination of multiple 
supporting networks and 
systems.   
Investment in infrastructure to 
support integration of new 
technologies in electricity grids, 
public transport, broadband, 
recycling. Planning of cities. 
Information Lack of awareness of 
technologies, actions or 
support. 
Labelling and information 
requirements on cars, 
domestic appliances, products 
more generally; awareness of 
options. 
Co-benefits Consideration of benefits 
beyond market rewards. 
Valuing ecosystems and 
biodiversity, recognising 
impacts on health. 
 
There are also important absent markets. We cannot trade fully, over long horizons, on future carbon.  
We cannot trade over new technologies because we do not know what technologies lie in the future.   
As a matter of basic theory, a competitive equilibrium with some absent markets cannot be assumed to 
be Pareto efficient. Such absences mean that expectations, and how they are formed, are crucial for 
investment. They can and should be shaped by public action, including by the key public policy and 
financial institutions which set direction. 
 




At the same time, there are difficult issues around knowledge of, or confidence in, future policies, in 
terms of their possible effects in relation to market participants. That issue is of real relevance to the 
shaping of expectations. The more that governments can build in predictability about how policy will 
change as learning occurs, the greater will be the confidence underpinning investment, innovation and 
future commitments. That is why I have emphasised (section 4.2) “predictable flexibility”. Part of 
confidence is based on track records which, unfortunately in the context of climate change, have seen 
chopping and changing (Stroebel and Wurgler, 2021). 
Further, given that governments are made up of complex compromises and coalitions, are limited in 
information and capabilities, and are not necessarily long lasting, we must recognise in our analysis 
that there are limits on their ability or willingness to “correct” for market failures and absent markets. 
Governments cannot fully commit to future actions in a credible way. They may have short time 
horizons, they may have different, narrower, objectives, and they face major administrative and political 
constraints. In thinking about public policy, we have to put all these considerations together and take 
into account how policies are constrained, might shift and can go wrong. And we can ask how to build 
strong institutions, which can survive across different parties in power and pressures of vested interests.  
These considerations underlie the rationale for the climate change legislation and the carbon budgets 
in the UK. The Climate Change Act and the Climate Change Committee, with its carbon budgets16, are 
good examples of where the law and institutions can play a valuable role. Indeed, the law is beginning 
to play a strong role in other countries too. In April 2021, Germany’s Constitutional Court upheld a claim 
challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions of the German Climate Protection Act. The court 
ruled that Germany’s legal requirement to meet the overall goals of the Paris Agreement, together with 
insufficiently strict 2030 emissions reduction targets, imply a rate of emissions reductions after 2030 
that places an unreasonable burden on future generations (Setzer and Higham, 2021). This decision 
prompted the German Cabinet to approve a bill that raises the ambition of the emissions reduction 
targets enshrined in the Climate Protection Act (Boldis and Lütkehaus, 2021). And in the Netherlands, 
the District Court of The Hague ruled in May 2021 that Royal Dutch Shell must cut its global carbon 
 
16 The Climate Change Act became law the UK in November 2008. It sets out emission reduction targets that the UK must 
comply with legally. The Act also provides a system of carbon budgeting; a series of five-year carbon budgets that set a 
pathway for the UK to meet its targets.  
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emissions by 45% compared to 2019 levels by 2030, due to an “unwritten standard of care” that Shell 
owes to Dutch residents under the Dutch civil code (Grimmitt, 2021).  
The GHG failure is top of our list of market failures. And carbon pricing has a critical role to play in 
tackling that market failure. However, we can see, from thinking about different aspects of market and 
government failures, that the policy question is much richer than carbon pricing alone. If we consider 
the very real circumstances of increasing returns to scale on mitigation action, strong risk, and worries 
about what government might do, we could argue that regulatory policies, such the phase-out of internal 
combustion engine (ICE) vehicles, have a strong role to play. The British government has set a date of 
2030 (and the EU 2035), beyond which ICE vehicles can no longer be sold. That provides a very clear 
and strong signal, which gives car firms the confidence to pursue the major fixed costs around the 
development of alternative technologies and moving to scale. The banning of incandescent light bulbs 
is a powerful example of how new and much better technologies can be developed and driven to low 
cost by regulation, and how the move to scale of new technologies can be fostered by the clarity 
regulation can bring. This regulation did not specify technologies to replace the incandescent bulbs, but 
required their phase out because they were so wasteful. Before long the far superior LED system came 
through and costs were driven down.  
In these circumstances of increasing returns and risk, alongside other market failures, such regulatory 
policies, alongside carbon pricing, could be more efficient and effective than carbon pricing alone. It is 
surprising therefore that some economists argue that the most efficient policy instrument is carbon 
pricing, and that we pursue others simply because this may be politically difficult. That is a theoretical 
mistake of real practical significance. 
Much of structural change will be around the functioning of major systems, including: energy, cities, 
transport, land. Clean power is at the centre of the transition to net zero. The global electricity supply 
will need to quadruple over the next three decades and it will all need to be zero carbon by 2040 (IEA, 
2021b; ETC, 2021) if we are to achieve net-zero emissions by mid-century. By 2050, around 2/3 of the 
world population is projected to live in cities, up from 55% in 2018 (UN, 2018). The choices made in 
cities on transport, infrastructure, buildings, and energy use, as they grow rapidly over the coming 
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decades, will determine whether the world can both manage climate change and realise the benefits of 
low-carbon growth.  
A recent estimate has suggested that transformation to reduce the current “hidden costs” of food and 
land use systems across the world could generate economic gains to society of $5.7 trillion annually by 
2030 and $10.5 trillion annually by 2050 (FOLU, 2019). These systems currently work rather poorly, so 
we have much to gain as we manage them better as we work to cut emissions. Indeed, in all too many 
cases, the structure of incentives embodied in agricultural policies and subsidies lead to land 
degradation, the poisoning of rivers and oceans, and the destruction of forests. Often the benefits of 
such policies accrue to richer enterprises. 
Progress in digital and AI technologies continues to move very rapidly, and these technologies will be 
enormously helpful in improving the management of systems. In this way, we are fortunate that these 
new technologies are moving so fast at exactly the moment we have to make major systemic changes. 
The need for new approaches to economic analysis of climate change raises an enormously rich 
research agenda. At the same time, action on scale is urgent. The transformation must be accelerated; 
we have to act strongly now. Thus we must think hard in real time about what we do now and its basis 
in current evidence, theory and judgement, whilst we pursue the most critical lines of research. That 
statement is true in general for those who have to make or advise on policy, but it applies particularly 
sharply here where urgency is of the essence. 
I have emphasised throughout this paper that managing climate change requires fundamental 
transformation of our economies: and it requires conceptual and evidential frameworks that can guide 
the policies and actions that can shape such transformations. Let me highlight some key areas for 
research. 
Changes in the behaviours and values of consumers, workers, shareholders, managers and voters 
are key to driving change in business and policy decisions, while business and policy decisions can 
also have a powerful influence on consumer behaviours. Understanding the political economy, and 
associated instabilities, constraints and opportunities, shaping the transition to net-zero will be important 
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both for creating effective policy frameworks to decarbonise at pace, and to accelerate the deployment 
of clean technologies across the economy. There has been a huge amount of progress in the literature 
in economics on behaviour, institutions, and political economy over the last 20-30 years. Interesting 
work on changing values in the context of climate is emerging (see e.g. Besley and Persson, 2020)17. 
Important areas for continued research include: behaviour change in the face of adjustment costs and 
missing information; and incentives and nudges. 
We must analyse how to support a just transition which recognises the problems of dislocation. Some 
jobs will disappear; others will change radically. Some locations may be partially affected.  There will 
be many new opportunities. Managing change so that all have a chance of benefitting will be not only 
an issue of justice, but also of political feasibility. Much of this will involve investment in people and 
places. And in some cases, direct income support. 
The necessary transformation of the economy relies critically on changing key systems: energy, cities, 
transport, land use. These large and complex systems cannot be changed by fiddling with just one 
parameter, a whole set of policies will be required to foster change. For example, you would not sensibly 
attempt to redesign a city to reduce congestion and pollution just via a carbon price, even though a 
carbon price is extremely important for looking after cities. Understanding how to foster change at the 
system level will be vital. Part of that will be around sequencing. For example, much of transport and 
heating will depend on electricity so that, if they are to be decarbonised, then electricity will have to be 
expanded quickly and itself be decarbonised. 
We are going to need to understand innovation in a much deeper and stronger way, because it is at 
the heart of the transition to net zero. The necessary innovation will go far beyond one particular 
technology, in one particular industry; it will be innovation across the whole range of our ways of doing 
things. Thus, more work is needed to understand the complementarities between different features of 
the innovation system, as well as between different types of innovation (Stern and Valero, 2020). 
 




Efficiency is something we will have to scrutinise much more carefully than we have done in the past. 
The simplistic perspective that ‘all that exists is efficient because if it is not efficient it would not exist’ is 
less than convincing at the best of times, but is thoroughly unconvincing in this case. There are all kinds 
of inefficiencies that exist in our economies and we must try to understand their nature and origins and 
how to overcome them. Ideas around the circular economy, and resource efficiency more generally, will 
be of fundamental importance.  
The functioning and role of financial institutions and “de-risking”, particularly in terms of the nature 
and scale of investments and activities they finance, will play a core role in climate action. There are 
important issues around financial regulation and the role of central banks (Dikau et al., 2021; Robins et 
al., 2021). 
And, finally, biodiversity. The Dasgupta Review on the Economics of Biodiversity, published earlier 
this year, is an important piece of work, which provides a valuable framework for looking at the issue of 
biodiversity loss. Though the climate and biodiversity crises are not the same thing, there are key 
dimensions of the two which do overlap and interweave, and we are going to have to tackle climate 
change and biodiversity loss together. A changing climate threatens biodiversity and loss of biodiversity, 
including through release of carbon, exacerbates climate change. Of course, biodiversity loss comes 
also from over-exploitation of our natural world, beyond climate change.  
The integration of nature-based solutions into climate policy risks focusing narrowly on afforestation, 
which can, in practice, encourage the establishment of monoculture plantations of fast-growing species 
(Seddon et al., 2019). This approach is neither best for long-term carbon storage (Hulvey et al., 2013) 
nor for preserving biodiversity. Instead, we should seek “nature-based solutions” that can promote 
diverse, intact natural ecosystems for preserving forest carbon sinks in the face of climate change 
(Sakschewski et al., 2016) and supporting human adaptation to climate change (Lavorel, et al., 2014). 
There is important research needed here on how to examine the mix of policies and the role of 
institutions that would help us to tackle these interrelated challenges.  
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8. Responsibility, opportunity, collaboration and leadership 
The strategic challenge is to move to a net-zero carbon economy within a few decades. The economics 
of action must be focused on the achievement of fundamental economic change at real pace, where 
time matters (Stern, 2018). That will involve, as I have stressed, looking at innovation, behaviour 
change, political economy, and the dynamics of all those elements. And we will need all of economics 
to take on these problems: international, industrial, labour, health, education, environment, energy, 
economic history and more. We should not be too narrowly focussed on a sub-discipline within 
economics if we are going to take on big problems of this kind; we should be economists. And we must 
work with other social scientists, scientists and engineers. Though we may have our specialities, we 
have to recognise that most elements of economics come into the challenge of climate change. There 
has never been anything more important, there has never been anything more fascinating, and we have 
much to offer from our existing set of ideas and tools if we put them to use. And we must develop new 
analysis and perspectives around risks and change. That is why I think it is time for change in 
economics.  
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